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Prosecutorial Vindictiveness and the Plea
Bargaining Exception: Bordenkircher v. Hayes
Four Years Later
INTRODUCTION

During the late 1960's and the early 1970's, the Supreme Court
began to develop two separate and inherently conflicting lines of
case law. The first, dealing with prosecutorial and judicial vindictiveness, recognized the need to protect and promote the free exercise of defendants' constitutional and statutory rights.' The second, involving the plea bargaining process, sanctioned states'
attempts to deter defendants from exercising these rights.'
In 1978, these two conflicting lines of cases collided in
Bordenkircher v. Hayes.s In Bordenkircher, a prosecutor
threatened to reindict a defendant on a charge carrying a potentially longer sentence if the defendant refused to accept the prosecutor's offer to plead guilty to a lesser charge. 4 When the defendant rejected this offer and exercised his right to trial, the
prosecutor retaliated by securing the indictment.5 The Supreme
Court upheld the defendant's conviction on the more serious
charges. In so doing, the Court effectively exempted prosecutorial
behavior during plea bargaining from the limitations it had previously imposed on prosecutorial vindictiveness.
Four years after the Bordenkircherdecision, lower courts remain
uncertain as to how the decision should be interpreted. Some
courts have suggested that Bordenkircher's wide grant of
prosecutorial discretion precludes vindictiveness claims within or

1. Vindictiveness case law was established in Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618
(1976); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974); Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47 (1973);
Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972); and
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
2. Plea bargaining case law was established in Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212
(1978); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257
(1971); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759
(1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
3. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
4. Id. at 358-59.
5. Id. at 359.
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without the context of plea bargaining. 6 Other courts have limited
their application of Bordenkircher to the plea bargaining setting
itself, denying only those vindictiveness claims which arise in the
plea bargaining context. 7 Still other courts, perhaps responding to
the extensive academic criticism brought against Bordenkircher,l
have restricted Bordenkircher's applicability even within the plea
bargaining situation.'
This article will address the present controversy among the

lower courts over Bordenkircher'sapplication to prosecutorial and
judicial vindictiveness. First, it will develop the conflicting lines of
case law leading to Bordenkircher. Next, it will examine the ac-

commodations reached by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourth Circuits between the Bordenkircher decision and previously imposed limitations on prosecutorial and judicial vindictiveness. Finally, this

article will suggest that the Fourth Circuit's approach best
achieves

the Supreme Court's

dual objectives

of deterring

prosecutorial and judicial vindictiveness and facilitating meaning6. See Frank v. Blackburn, 646 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc); Miller v. Superintendent, 480 F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); State v. Davis, 582 S.W.2d 342, 343 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979); See also United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449, 457 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (Merritt, J., dissenting). But see United States v. Goodwin, 637 F.2d 250, 254 (4th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449, 457 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
7. See Koski v. Samaha, 648 F.2d 790 (1st Cir. 1981); Williams v. Missouri, 640 F.2d 140
(8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 499 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc); Foxman v.
Renison, 625 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Gardner, 611 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1980);
Waite v. United States, 601 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Allsup, 573 F.2d 1141
(9th Cir. 1978); State v. Longbine, 263 N.W.2d 527 (Iowa 1978); Cox v. State, 2 Kan. App.
2d 121, 575 P.2d 905 (1978); Jones v. State, 595 P.2d 1344 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979); State v.
Letterman, 603 S.W.2d 951 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Gallagher, 177 Mont 150, 580 P.2d
930 (1980).
8. The academic community has criticized Bordenkircher v. Hayes as a poorly reasoned,
muddled decision which, by wrongly ignoring the vindictiveness cases, effectively insulated
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion during plea bargaining from review. See Abrams,
Systematic Coercion: UnconstitutionalConditions in the Criminal Law, 72 J. Cmi. L. 128,
128-37, 160-64 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Abrams]; Nemerson, Coercive Sentencing, 64
MiNN. L. Rav. 670, 713-50 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Nemerson]. For an overview of coercive sentencing with specific emphasis and criticism of Bordenkircher,see Note, The Relationship Between ProsecutorialDiscretionand Vindictiveness in Plea Bargaining,33 ARK.
L. Rzv. 211 (1979) (hereinafter cited as Note, Discretion and Vindictiveness). For a direct
examination of Bordenkircher,see Note, ProsecutorialVindictiveness and Plea Bargaining:
What are the Limits - Bordenkircherv. Hayes, 27 Dz PAUL L. Rzv. 1241 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, Limits on Vindictiveness).
9. See United States v. Goodwin, 637 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Groves,
571 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Ruegsa-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir.
1976); People v. Ivery, 615 P.2d 80 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980); People v. Walker, 84 Il. 2d 512,
419 N.E.2d 1167 (1981); Commonwealth v. Tirrel, 80 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1223, 406
N.E.2d 869 (1980); Washington v. Swindell, 93 Wash. 2d 192, 607 P.2d 852 (1980).
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ful plea bargaining.
BACKGROUND

Due Process and Judicial Vindictiveness
The principle of due process which demands that a defendant be
free from fear of reprisal when exercising a constitutional or procedural right 0 was first established by the United States Supreme
Court in North Carolinav. Pearce." In Pearce, the defendant was
convicted initially of assault with intent to commit rape and sentenced to twelve to fifteen years in prison.' In a state post-conviction proceeding brought several years later, Pearce alleged that the
conviction was unconstitutional because it was based on an involuntary confession. The Supreme Court of North Carolina agreed
and reversed the conviction." Pearce was then retried, convicted,
and sentenced to a prison term of eight years by the same judge
who had presided at the first trial. Added to the time he had already served, this eight year term created a longer sentence than
had been imposed originally. 4
The Supreme Court reviewed the constitutional issues raised in
Pearce together with those raised by the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Simpson v. Rice. In Simpson, the defendant had been sentenced to
prison terms totalling ten years upon pleading guilty to four separate charges of second degree burglary.' After the judgments were
set aside in a state coram nobis proceeding, Rice was retried on
three of the counts and sentenced to a total of twenty-five years in
prison.'6
In considering the sentences imposed by the lower courts in both
cases, the United States Supreme Court, with Justice Stewart writ10. See Schulhoffer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 733 (1980), for an
overview of due process considerations in sentencing [hereinafter cited as Schulhoffer].
11. 395 U.S. 711 (1969). North Carolinav. Pearce was a natural outgrowth of the Court's
decision in United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), which found a provision of the
Federal Kidnapping Act, ch. 645 § 1, 62 Stat. 760 (1948) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §
1201(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (authorizing the death penalty if the defendant was found
guilty by a jury, but authorizing any term up to life imprisonment if the defendant pleaded
guilty, or had a bench trial), unconstitutional. The Jackson court held that since the provision needlessly discouraged assertion of the defendant's fifth amendment right not to plead
guilty and sixth amendment right to a jury trial, it was patently unconstitutional.
12. 395 U.S. at 713.
13. State v. Pearce, 266 N.C. 234, 145 S.E.2d 918 (1966).
14. 395 U.S. at 713.
15. Id. at 714.
16. Id.
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ing for the majority, held that the judicially enhanced sentences
deprived Pearce and Rice of their rights to due process, because
the sentences appeared to penalize them for exercising constitutional and statutory rights.1 7 The Court held that due process of
law requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having
successfully attacked his prior conviction must play no part in the
sentence imposed after a new trial. 18 The Court added that, since
fear of vindictiveness might deter a defendant's exercise of his
rights to appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be free of apprehension of such
retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge.' 9
In the Court's view, it was the mere appearance of the judge's
retaliatory motivation, and not the judge's actual motivation, that
violated the defendants' due process rights.' 0 The Court held that
this appearance of vindictiveness was a per se violation of due process, because it unduly burdened the free exercise of rights by the
defendants. 2 Therefore, the Court created a set of prophylactic
rules to remove the appearance of vindictiveness from sentencing
22
after retrial.
On the other hand, if the sentencing decision does not inherently
give rise to an appearance of vindictiveness, a due process violation
is not established. For this reason, vindictiveness claims failed in
two subsequent Supreme Court cases. In Colten v. Kentucky,2 3 the
defendant had been convicted of a misdemeanor offense in a Kentucky inferior court and fined ten dollars. 4 After exercising his
right to a trial de novo in a court of general jurisdiction, the defendant was convicted of the same offense and fined fifty dollars.25
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky affirmed,'26 rejecting Colten's ar-

17.

Id. at 724-26.

18.

Id. at 725.

19. Id.
20. Id. at 724.
21. Id. at 724-26.
22. Id. at 726, where the Court said that whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, his reason for doing so must affirmatively appear
in the record. Moreover, those reasons must be based on objective information concerning
identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant, occurring after the time of the original
sentencing procedure. Finally, the Court required that the factual data upon which the increased sentence was based be made a part of the record, so that the "constitutional legitimacy" of the increased sentence could be fully reviewed on appeal.
23. 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
24. Id. at 107-08.
25. Id. at 108.
26. Colten v. Commonwealth, 467 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971).
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gument that the higher sentence violated the prohibitions set out
in Pearce. The Supreme Court held that Pearce only applies to
sentences increased due to an appearance of retaliatory motivation.2 7 In Colten, the Court found that the increased sentence
could not possibly have been a product of retaliatory motivation,
because the de novo court was uninformed of the first sentence and
had no stake in the earlier conviction.2 8 Therefore, the Court ruled
that the actions of the circuit court judge did not give rise to the
2 9
per se appearance of vindictiveness prohibited by Pearce.
Similarly, in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 0 the Court declined to apply Pearce because retaliatory motivation was not inherent in the
sentencing decision. After having obtained a reversal of his original
fifteen year sentence, Chaffin was retried and given a life sentence
by a jury.,1 The Supreme Court found that since the jury was uninformed of the first sentence, and was not in a position to possess
retaliatory motivation against the defendant, the higher sentence
(which was within the limits set by law) was not a product of an
inherently retaliatory situation.3 2 Thus, Chaffin's sentence, like
Colten's, failed to give rise to the per se appearance of vindictiveness precluded by Pearce.
Due Process and ProsecutorialVindictiveness
3 the Court extended
In Blackledge v. Perry,"
Pearce's prohibition against judicial vindictiveness to the context of inherently retaliatory actions of prosecutors. Perry had been involved in an altercation with another inmate while serving a prison term. He was
convicted of a misdemeanor in a North Carolina state district
court and sentenced to six months additional imprisonment.3 4 The
sentence was to be served at the completion of his original sentence. Perry then filed a notice of appeal 5 under a North Carolina
statute giving persons convicted in the district courts an absolute

27. 407 U.S. at 116.
28. Id. at 116-17. See also Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618 (1976) (the Court,
relying on Colten, held that the possibility of a higher sentence in Massachusetts' two-tier
court system did not impermissibly burden the accused's right to a jury trial).
29. 407 U.S. at 116-17.
30. 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
31. Id. at 19-20.
32. Id. at 26-27. "Georgia is one of a small number of states that entrusts the sentencing
function in felony cases to the jury rather than to the judge." Id. at 21 n.7.
33. 417 U.S. 21, 28 (1974).
34. - Id. at 22.

35.

Id.
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right to a trial de novo in the superior court.3"
After Perry filed the appeal, but before he was required to appear for trial de novo, the' prosecutor reindicted him on a felony
charge based upon the same conduct which had resulted in the
misdemeanor charge. 37 Perry pleaded guilty and was sentenced to
five to seven years, which were to be seryed concurrently with his
original sentence. This sentence increased Perry's potential period
of incarceration by seventeen months. 38
The Supreme Court, in another opinion authored by Justice
Stewart, held that Perry's felony indictment violated due process
because it appeared to penalize the exercise of statutory rights of
appeal." The Court stated that the due process clause was not offended by all possibilities of increased punishment upon retrial,
but only by those possibilities that posed a realistic likelihood of
vindictive motivation.4 0 The Court found such a realistic likelihood
inherent in the prosecutor's actions against Perry. 1
The Court noted that the prosecutor had a considerable stake in
discouraging Perry from appealing, since an appeal would have required increased effort to secure Perry's conviction and might even
have resulted in a reversal.4 2 The Court also noted that if the prosecutor had the means "readily at hand to discourage . . . appeals
by 'upping the ante' through a felony indictment whenever a convicted misdemeanant pursue[d] his statutory appellate remedy-the State [could] insure that only the most hardy defendants
[would] brave the hazards of a de novo trial. 43 In order to prevent
any appearance of vindictiveness, the Court again adopted prophylactic rules.4 4 The rule, which was developed in Pearce and expanded in Perry, prohibits even the appearance of judicial or
prosecutorial retaliation against a defendant who exercises any

36. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-290, 15-177.1 (1969).
37. 417 U.S. at 23.
38. The five to seven year sentence did not begin to run until the date of the guilty plea.
By that time, Perry had already served seventeen months of his original sentence. Therefore, the concurrent sentence increased his potential incarceration period by seventeen
months, rather than the six month increase which would have resulted from the district
court's consecutive sentence. Id. at 23 n.2.
39. Id. at 27-29.
40. Id. at 27.
41. Id. at 27-28.
42. Id. at 27.
43. Id. at 27-28.
44. Id. at 27.
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constitutional or statutory right.45

ProsecutorialDiscretion anc Plea Bargaining
At the same time as the Supreme Court was developing rules to
prohibit judicial and prosecutorial vindictiveness, it was also developing rules with respect to plea bargaining. 4" But whereas in the
vindictiveness cases the Court had protected a defendant's free exercise of rights, in the plea bargaining cases the Court sanctioned
states' attempts to deter defendants from exercising their fifth and
sixth amendment rights. In Brady v. United States,47 the Court,
for the first time, implicitly approved the plea bargaining process
by recognizing circumstances where a defendant could be induced
to forgo both his right to plead not guilty and his right to request a
trial.4 8
In Brady, the defendant alleged that his guilty plea was unconstitutionally coerced by the sentencing provisions of the Federal
Kidnapping Act. 49 Brady relied on United States v. Jackson,50
which had earlier held the same statutory provisions unconstitutionally coercive. The kidnapping statute imposed a death sen-

45. Although the rule prohibiting judicial and prosecutorial vindictiveness was originally
applied only as a means of protecting a defendant's right to appeal, other courts interpreted
and broadened the rule to bar retaliation against the exercise of any constitutional or statutory right. See United States v. Goodwin, 637 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1981) (retaliation for exercise of right to jury trial); United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc)
(retaliation for successfully pressing bail appeal); Wilson v. Thompson, 593 F.2d 1375 (5th
Cir. 1979) (retaliation for exercise of first amendment rights); United States v. Groves, 571
F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1978) (retaliation for exercise of a statutory right to dismissal under the
Speedy Trial Act).
46. For a discussion of prosecutorial discretion, see, e.g., Schulhoffer, supra note 10, at
778-821; Note, Discretionand Vindictiveness, supra note 8, at 212-16; Note, Limits on Vindictiveness, supra note 8, at 1246-47. For a discussion of plea bargaining, see Alschuler, The
Prosecutor'sRole in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Cm. L. Rav. 50 (1968), and infra notes 48, 5455.
47. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
48. Id. at 751. The Supreme Court cited four circumstances in which a defendant could
be induced to forgo his fifth and sixth amendment rights and plead guilty. Those circumstances were: (1) where a defendant pleads guilty because in his jurisdiction both the judge
and jury have sentencing power and he knows the judge is usually more lenient; (2) where
only the judge has sentencing power but a defendant pleads guilty because the judge gives
more lenient sentences to those who plead than to those who go to trial; (3) where a defendant pleads guilty because the prosecutor and judge have allowed him to plead to a lesser
offense; and (4) where a defendant pleads guilty to certain counts with the understanding
that the others will be dropped. Id.
49. Ch. 645 § 1, 62 Stat. 760 (1948) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980)).
50. 390 U.S. 581 (1968).
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tence on defendants found guilty by a jury, and a prison sentence
on defendants pleading guilty or found guilty by a judge.
The Supreme Court rejected Brady's claim that the statute deterred him from invoking his right to trial. The Court affirmed his
sentence, finding that his plea was both voluntary and informed.5"
Jackson, according to the Court, neither ruled that all guilty pleas
"encouraged by the fear of a possible death sentence were involuntary pleas, nor that such encouraged pleas were invalid whether
voluntary or not."5 2 In so holding, the Court recognized the government's power to coerce or "encourage" guilty pleas.5 3
The Supreme Court went on to note in Brady that guilty pleas
were mutually advantageous to both the defendant and the state.54
Moreover, pleas had become an important component of the
American criminal justice system." A defendant had a legitimate
interest in consenting to the imposition of a lesser penalty by
pleading guilty, rather than facing a trial with an unpredictable
outcome.56 Because of these features of guilty pleas, the Court refused to hold that guilty pleas were in themselves unconstitution57
ally coercive or invalid.
51. 397 U.S. at 758. Brady was charged with violating the Federal Kidnapping Act and
entered a plea of not guilty. After learning that his co-defendant had confessed and had
agreed to testify against him, Brady changed his plea to guilty. His plea was accepted after
the trial judge questioned him twice as to its voluntariness. Brady was sentenced to fifty
years in prison, which was later reduced to thirty years. He appealed his sentence on the
grounds that his plea was coerced by the statute, which imposed death if found guilty by a
jury and any term up to life if found guilty by a judge or through a plea. Ch. 645 § 1, 62
Stat. 760 (1948) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). This same
statute was held unconstitutional in United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 581 (1968), because
it coerced defendants to enter pleas of guilty and unduly burdened the exercise of their fifth
and sixth amendment rights. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court rejected Brady's argument
and affirmed his sentence, finding that his plea was voluntary and informed. The Court
found that it was Brady's fear of his co-defendant's testimony - and not the statute - that
had motivated his guilty plea.
52. 397 U.S. at 747.
53. Id.
54. Advantages to the guilty defendant included limitation of the probable sentence, reduced exposure to the criminal justice system, immediate service of sentence, and the forgoing of "the practical burdens of a trial." The state, on the other hand, would benefit by
avoiding trial and its associated burden of proof by promptly inflicting punishment and by
conserving prosecutorial and judicial resources for those cases where there is a substantial
issue of guilt. Id. at 752.
55. The court noted that well over 75% of the criminal convictions in this country come
from guilty pleas. In fact, 90% to 95% of all criminal convictions and 70% to 85% of all
felony convictions were obtained through guilty pleas at the time of Brady. Id. at 752 n.10.
56. Id. at 752.
57. Id. at 750. The Supreme Court had established the legitimacy of plea bargaining in
two other decisions, Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970), and McMann v. Rich-
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In only a five year span, the Supreme Court established the following recognized principles: due process requires that a defendant
be free from coercion in exercising his constitutional and statutory
right to a trial;5 8 a state may induce a defendant to forgo these
rights during the mutually advantageous process of plea bargaining;5 and prosecutorial vindictiveness may unconstitutionally taint
the relationship between prosecutor and defendant.6 0 In effect,
then, the Court's decisions had both secured the free exercise of
defendants' rights and sanctioned prosecutorial attempts to prevent defendants from exercising those. rights. It was against this
background of conflicting precedents that Bordenkircher v. Hayes
came before the Court.
BORDENKIRCHER v. HAYES

Factual Background
Defendant Hayes had been indicted for uttering a forged instrument in the amount of $88.30.61 After arraignment on the charge,
Hayes' counsel and the Commonwealth's Attorney met in the presence of the clerk of the court to negotiate a plea. The prosecutor
offered to recommend a sentence of five years imprisonment in return for Hayes' guilty plea.6 2 He threatened that if Hayes did not
accept the agreement and "save the Court the inconvenience and
necessity of trial,""3 he would reindict Hayes under Kentucky's
Habitual Criminal Act." Conviction under Kentucky's Habitual
Criminal Act 65 would have subjected Hayes to a mandatory life
ardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970). These three cases are commonly known as the "Brady Trilogy."
See also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (where the Supreme Court openly
acknowledges the constitutionality of plea bargaining).
58. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), had been decided just one year before
Brady, yet the Brady opinion did not mention Pearce.
59. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). The Court did, however, include this
warning: "We here make no reference to the situation where the prosecutor or judge, or
both, deliberately employ their charging and sentencing powers to induce a particular defendant to tender a plea of guilty .... " Id. at 751 n.8.
60. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
61. Ky. REV. STAT. § 434.130(1)(repealed 1974): "Any person who forges or counterfeits
any writing. . . or any person who utters and publishes such an instrument as true, knowing it to be forged and counterfeited, shall be confined in the penitentiary for not less than
two (2) nor more than ten (10) years."
62. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358 (1978).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. The provision of the Kentucky Habitual Criminal Act applicable at the time of appellant's indictment, Ky. REv. STAT. § 431.190 (repealed 1975), provided:
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sentence. Hayes refused to plead guilty and insisted on a full
trial.6 The prosecutor obtained the indictment and Hayes was
convicted on the forgery charge. 7 In a separate proceeding, he was
convicted of being a habitual criminal and given the mandatory
life sentence.6 8
The Sixth Circuit Opinion
Hayes appealed to the Sixth Circuit 9 following an unsuccessful appeal to the Kentucky Court of Appeals and a denial of his
writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court. The Sixth Circuit first considered Hayes' due process rights as delineated in the
Supreme Court's vindictiveness decisions.7 0 Then, the court
weighed these rights against the need for prosecutorial discretion
in inducing a defendant to plead guilty, as had been previously
outlined in the Court's plea bargaining cases.7 1 The Sixth Circuit
found that the habitual offender indictment gave rise to an appearance of prosecutional vindictiveness and thus a per se due process
violation. 72 Based on this finding, the Court ordered Hayes discharged after completing the sentence "imposed solely for the
crime of uttering a forged instrument. 7' The Supreme Court

Any person convicted . . . a third time of a felony . . . shall be confined in the
penitentiary during his life. Judgment in such cases shall not be given for the
increased penalty unless the jury finds, from the record and other competent evidence, the fact of former convictions for felony committed by the prisoner, in or
out of this state. "
66. 434 U.S. at 359.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d 42 (6th Cir. 1976).
70. Id. at 44.
71. Id.
72. The Sixth Circuit found that the defendant's due process rights carried more weight
than the state's contention that the entire concept of plea bargaining would be destroyed if
prosecutors were not allowed to seek convictions on more serious charges after defendants
refused to plead guilty. Id. Although a prosecutor could offer a defendant concessions in the
course of plea bargaining, the Court found that Pearce and Perry precluded the prosecutor
from threatening a defendant with the consequence that more severe charges would be
brought if he insisted on going to trial. Id. Therefore, the Court determined that if after
plea negotiations failed the prosecutor procured an indictment charging a more serious
crime, the new charges would establish an appearance of vindictiveness which would violate
due process, per se, unless the prosecutor could justify his actions by coming forth with
objective reasons for the charges as required by Perry's prophylactic rules. Id. at 44-45.
Here, however, the prosecutor could not meet this burden and had admitted to actual retaliatory motivation. Id. at 45.
73. Id. at 45. Other circuits are in accord with the approach taken by the Sixth Circuit in
Hayes v. Cowan. See, e.g., United States v. De Marco, 550 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1977) (where
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granted certiorari. 4
The Supreme Court Opinion
In another opinion authored by Justice Stewart 7 5 the Supreme Court acknowledged the judicial and prosecutorial vindictiveness cases and agreed with the Sixth Circuit that it would be
patently unconstitutional for an agent of the state "to pursue a
course of action whose objective [was] to penalize a person's reliance on his legal rights."''7 Contrary to its characterization of the
prosecutor's role in Blackledge v. Perry,77 however, the Court refused to characterize the prosecutor's actions in Bordenkircher as
an attempt to penalize Hayes for exercising his right to trial.78 Unlike the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court believed that since the
prosecutor initially had the power to indict Hayes under the habitual offender statute, and since he had informed Hayes of that
power, the two indictments only evidenced the prosecutor's attempt to extend one of the benefits of plea bargaining-a reduced
sentence-to the defendant.7 9 The Supreme Court's plea bargaining cases had established that in the "'give-and-take' of plea
bargaining there is no such element of punishment or retaliation so
long as the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecution's offer."80 Therefore, the prosecutor's actions fell within the legitimate
the government obtained a second felony indictment after the defendant exercised venue
and trial rights, the action violated vindictiveness law); United States v. Ruegsa-Martinez,
534 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1976) (where the court held that in view of vindictiveness law, a
prosecutor's suggestion that the power of the prosecutor to adjust the charges against an
accused at will inheres in his power to engage in plea bargaining was without merit).
74. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 431 U.S. 953 (1978).
75. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978), was a five to four decision, with Chief
Justice Burger and Justices White, Rehnquist and Stevens joining Justice Stewart in the
majority opinion. Justices Brennan and Marshall joined in a dissent by Justice Blackmun.
Justice Powell dissented separately, stating that he was not "satisfied that the result in this
case [was] just or that the conduct of the plea bargaining met the requirements of due
process." Id. at 368-69 (Powell, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 363.
77. 417 U.S. 21, 27-28 (1974).
78. 434 U.S. at 364-65.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 363. Some lower federal courts have found instances in which a defendant's
free choice was unduly burdened. In United States v. Harris, 635 F.2d 526 (6th Cir. 1980), a
probation officer's recommendation was employed to persuade the defendant to plead guilty.
The Sixth Circuit, determining that the probation officer was an arm of the court, ruled the
judiciary was unnecessarily introduced into the plea bargaining process. In United States v.
Velsicol Chem. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 1255 (D.D.C. 1980), the court ruled the defendant did
not have a free and unencumbered choice because the prosecution had made an unspecified
threat. In Schaffner v. Greco, 458 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), the court found that the

1022

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 13

exercise of prosecutorial discretion."1
By defining plea bargaining as a situation uninfluenced by retaliatory motivation, the Court distinguished it from those inherently
retaliatory situations it had found in vindictiveness cases. 81 Thus,
the Court could easily "accept as constitutionally legitimate the
simple reality that the prosecutor's interest at the bargaining table
is to persuade the defendant to forgo his right to plead not
guilty,"8 3 and thereby exempt prosecutorial behavior during plea
bargaining from the limitations it had previously imposed in its
vindictiveness cases.
CONFUSION IN THE CIRCUITS

The Supreme Court's failure to distinguish accurately between
'the actions of the prosecutors in Perry and Bordenkircher has resulted in a confused application of the Bordenkircher decision. In
each case, the prosecutor retaliated against the defendant in order
to advance the same goals: the prompt imposition of punishment,
the certainty of conviction, the avoidance of trial, and the conservation of judicial and prosecutorial resources. 8 ' Despite the identical motivation of the prosecutors in Perry and Bordenkircher,
however, the Court found that the actions of the one prosecutor
were inherently retaliatory, while the actions of the other were
not.8" Because the Supreme Court has failed to explain sufficiently
how the plea bargaining situation neutralizes the prosecutor's role,
lower federal courts have been uncertain when to apply the limitations against judicial and prosecutorial vindictiveness to the plea
bargaining context.
The Fifth, Sixth and Fourth Circuits recently have confronted
the issue of Bordenkircher's application to plea bargaining situations where vindictiveness is arguably present. The Fifth Circuit

judge's participation in plea bargaining unduly burdened the defendant's free choice. See
cases cited infra note 97.
81. 434 U.S. at 363.
82. See supra notes 10-22 and accompanying text.
83. 434 U.S. at 364.
84. These goals were approved in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970),
where the Court noted them as the advantages the state was pursuing in participating in
plea bargaining.
85. In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978), the Court defined the defendantprosecutor plea bargaining relationship as one which flows from "mutuality of advantage."
Id. at 363 (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970)). But in Blackledge v.
Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974), the Court. presented. the prosecutor as an adversary, with a
considerable "stake" in the proceedings.
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read Bordenkircher expansively,"6 the Sixth Circuit limited
Bordenkircherto the traditional plea bargaining context, 7 and the
Fourth Circuit constrained Bordenkircher's applicability to its
facts.8 8 Since these three different approaches to Bordenkircher represent the three basic approaches used currently by the other circuit courts, an examination of these decisions will present an overto
prosecutorial
view
of Bordenkircher's applicability
vindictiveness.
Frank v. Blackburn: The Fifth Circuit Approach
Prior to Bordenkircher,the Fifth Circuit had employed two separate balancing tests to determine whether a prosecutor had acted
vindictively. 9 The case of Frank v. Blackburn,9" however, demonstrates that the Fifth Circuit no longer employs these tests. In the
Fifth Circuit, Bordenkircher and its grant of prosecutorial discretion"1 has been read to control cases even involving judicial
86. Frank v. Blackburn, 646 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc). On October 1, 1981, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was reorganized and split into two
circuits, the Eleventh and the "new Fifth." The Eleventh Circuit has expressly adopted as
precedent the case law of the "former Fifth" Circuit as the latter court existed on September 30, 1981. Bonner v. City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). It
might also be noted that over one-half of the judges on the Eleventh Circuit took part in the
Frank decision.
87. United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
88. United States v. Goodwin, 637 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1981).
89. In Hardwick v. Doolittle, 558 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1049
(1978), the court announced the first test, which established that where a prosecutor adds a
new charge for relatively distinct conduct which has occurred in the same "spree of activity," the defendant's due process rights are offended only if the defendant proves actual
vindictiveness. Merely showing an appearance of vindictiveness does not suffice under these
circumstances. This vindictiveness test has also been adopted by a district court in the Second Circuit. United States v. Rodriguez, 429 F. Supp. 520, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The Second
Circuit also adheres to a policy favoring wide grants of prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining. Foxman v. Renison, 625 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1980); Miller v. Superintendent, 480 F.
Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); United States v. Butler, 414 F. Supp. 394, (Conn. 1976).
The second test employed in the Fifth Circuit was announced in Jackson v. Walker, 585
F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1978). This approach uses a balancing test to determine whether to require a showing of actual vindictiveness or only the appearance of vindictiveness. The effect
that allowing the second indictment will have, with respect to chilling the exercise of the
defendant's rights, is weighed against the effect that forbidding the second indictment will
have on prosecutorial discretion. If the second factor outweighs the first, then a showing of
actual vindictiveness is needed to establish the claim. For cases applying the Jackson v.
Walker test, see United States v. Thomas, 593 F.2d 615, 624 (5th Cir. 1979), appeal after
remand, 617 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1980); Miracle v. Estelle, 592 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir. 1979).
90. 646 F.2d 873 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
91. Other courts have also read Bordenkircher as granting wide prosecutorial discretion.
See, e.g., Martinez v. Romero, 626 F.2d 807 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v. Adkins, 464 F.
Supp. 419 (D. Tenn. 1978); Miller v. State, 269 Ark. 341, 605 S.W.2d 430 (Ark. 1980); State
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vindictiveness.
The Decision
The issue in Frank v. Blackburn was whether a defendant, who
received a thirty-three year sentence for armed robbery after his
rejection of a twenty year sentence offered by a state court judge in
return for a guilty plea, had established that the increased sentence was a product of vindictiveness." A panel of the Fifth Circuit had previously granted federal habeas corpus relief, finding
that Frank had been penalized by the state judge for exercising his
constitutional right to trial.as In the opening paragraph of the en
banc opinion, however, Judge Fay explained the reason for rehearing the case. Judge Fay wrote that the circuit "decided to rehear
the case en banc because of its potentially devastating impact
upon the plea bargaining process."" The court then rejected the
defendant's allegations of vindictiveness by a majority of sixteen to
seven.
In order to find against Frank and honor "the outer limits of
in
plea bargaining
practices"' 5
delineated
permissible
Bordenkircher,the Fifth Circuit had to find that the case was controlled by Bordenkircher rather than by the vindictiveness cases.
There were, however, two major obstacles to overcome before the
Court could apply Bordenkircher. First, Bordenkircher had characterized "plea bargaining" as a negotiation between the prosecutor and defendant. Second, other courts, relying on rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure," had prohibited judicial par0

v. Kailua Auto Wreckers, Inc., 62 Hawaii 222, 615 P.2d 730 (Hawaii 1980); State v. O'Brien,
272 N.W.2d 69 (S.D. 1978). For the proposition that the prosecutor can also use selectivity
in deciding with which defendants to plea bargain, see United States v. Rosales-Lopez, 617
F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1980); McMillian v. United States, 582 F.2d 1061 (8th Cir. 1978); People
v. Ruiz, 78 IMI.App. 3d 326, 396 N.E.2d 1314 (1979). See also United States v. Batchelder,
442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979) (citing Bordenkircherfor the proposition that a prosecutor can use
selectivity in deciding which charges to bring against which defendants, as long as the selectivity is not based upon race or religion).
92. 646 F.2d at 883. Other courts have found no vindictiveness in similar situations.
United States v. Herrera, 640 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that a prosecutor was not
bound by a plea bargain after the defendant initially refused it); McMillian v. United
States, 583 F.2d 1061 (8th Cir. 1978) and New York v. Pena, 50 N.Y.2d 400, 406 N.E.2d
1347 (1980) (both holding that a judge was not bound to sentence in accordance with a
rejected plea bargain).
93. Frank v. Blackburn, 602 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1979).
94. Frank v. Blackburn, 646 F.2d 873, 875 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
95. Id. at 878.
96. FD. R. CrM. P. 11(e)(1) provides in relevant part that "[t]he attorney for the government and the attorney for the defendant or the defendant when acting pro se may en-
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ticipation in plea bargaining, finding that such participation violated the "mutuality" of the situation and was unduly coercive to
defendants. 9
The Fifth Circuit avoided the first obstacle by redefining plea
bargaining to include judicial participation. Plea bargaining, as described in Judge Fay's opinion, is- a "process of negotiation in
which the prosecutor, trial judge, or some official in the criminal
justice system, offers the defendant certain concessions in exchange for an admission of guilt."8 The court was also able to skirt

the second obstacle. Although it had "previously expressed . . .
agreement with Rule 11's prohibition of judicial involvement in
plea bargains,"" the court explained that it had also recognized
that rule 11 "states a standard for Federal Courts, not necessarily
a constitutional inhibition." 1° Thus, the majority concluded that
rule 11 was not binding on state courts.1 0'
The majority relied on Bordenkircher for the proposition that
during plea bargaining, defendants are free to accept or reject bargains offered by the state.'10 Once a defendant has freely chosen to
reject such an offer, he or she cannot complain that the sentence
imposed after that trial exceeds the reduced sentence originally offered in return for the plea.'0 3 Because Frank had freely chosen to
reject the judge's offer during plea bargaining, the majority ruled

gage in discussions with a view toward reaching an agreement." This provision has been
interpreted to mean that only the attorneys shall engage in plea bargaining. See cases cited
infra note 97.
97. United States v. Harris, 635 F.2d 526 (6th Cir. 1980) (citing Griffith v. Wyrick, 527
F.2d 109, 111 n.2 (8th Cir. 1975)); United States v. Werker, 535 F.2d 198 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 926 (1976); United States v. Gallington, 488 F.2d 637, 640 (8th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 907 (1974); Schaffner v. Greco, 458 F. Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
98. 646 F.2d at 875.
99. Id. at 880.
100. Id. Generally, in order to avoid the appearance of impropriety due to the possibility
of coercion during plea bargaining discussions, state courts have joined federal courts in
disapproving judicial participation in plea bargaining. See comment and cases cited in STANDARDS FOR CmMINAL JUSTICE § 14-3.3 commentary at 84-85. (2d ed. 1980). Recently, however, some states have followed the lead of the new ABA Standard 14-3.3 which, while
prohibiting the judge from initiating plea discussions, allows him greater participation as a
moderator. But, even though the new plea bargaining standards suggest greater judicial involvement, the comments to the standards stress that the "standards do not suggest that
the Court should play the role of active bargainer. Instead [they suggest] that the judge
shall serve as moderator." Id. at 14.85. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, I 402(d)(1) (1981)
(allowing the trial judge to take part in plea discussions).
101. 646 F.2d at 882.
102. Id. at 883.
103. See cases cited asupra note 97.
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that he could not argue that later imposition of a higher sentence
constituted vindictive punishment.'0 4
The effort the Fifth Circuit employed to remove two formidable
obstacles in order to apply Bordenkircher demonstrates the circuit's adherence to Bordenkircher outside of the limited plea bargaining context in which the case arose. Two additional factors, the
court's rehearing of the Frank case so as to prevent a "devastating
impact" on plea bargaining, and the circuit's decision to apply
Bordenkircher instead of its formerly announced tests,0 5 point to
the circuit's narrow application of due process limitations on judicial and prosecutorial vindictiveness in the plea bargaining
context.
Analysis
There are two basic problems with the Fifth Circuit's expansive
reading of Bordenkircher. First, Bordenkircher was intended to
create an exception to the vindictiveness cases, not to create a replacement for them. As long as the Supreme Court's earlier decisions continue to be good law, the circuits should continue to apply
their vindictiveness standards only to cases that arise outside of
the prosecutor-defendant plea bargaining context.'0 6
Second, by extending Bordenkircher to cases of judicial involvement in plea bargaining, the Fifth Circuit creates the potential for
even greater harm to the plea bargaining process. The federal
prohibitions against judicial participation in plea bargaining were
created to keep the "give and take" and mutuality of benefit between the state and defendant free from judicial pressure.0 7 By
redefining plea bargaining as a process in which the judge is free to
participate, the Fifth Circuit sanctions judicial plea bargaining and
invites other courts to circumvent the careful balance between the
state and the defendant upon which plea bargaining rests. Therefore, because the Fifth Circuit fails to limit Bordenkircher and to
preserve the authority of the vindictiveness cases outside of the
traditional plea bargaining context, its approach threatens the ex-

104. 646 F.2d at 887.
105. See supra note 89.
106. See United States v. Andrews, 633 F.2d 449, 457 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc). Moreover, since the Fifth Circuit found that there were objective reasons in the record which
could have justified the defendant's increased punishment, the court could have reached the
same result by applying Pearce'sprophylactic rules. This approach would have confined the
Bordenkircher exception to its original context. See supra note 15.
107. See cases cited supra note 70.
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istence of both the due process rights protected in the vindictiveness cases and the validity of the plea bargaining process itself.
United States v. Andrews: the Sixth Circuit's Approach
The Decision
In United States v. Andrews,10 8 the Sixth Circuit, sitting en
banc, held seven to four that a prosecutor's action in obtaining a
second indictment charging defendants with an additional conspiracy count after they had successfully pressed their bail appeal,
could give rise to a "realistic likelihood of vindictiveness," which
would establish a due process violation.1 0 9 In sharp contrast to the
Fifth Circuit's stated purpose in Frank for rehearing the case en
banc,11 0 the Sixth Circuit reheard Andrews en banc to resolve
"questions regarding the limits of prosecutorial discretion," in order to arrive at a standard for applying the "doctrine of
'prosecutorial vindictiveness.' ", A panel of the court had considered the question earlier, producing three separate opinions and no
112
consensus.
The Sixth Circuit began its inquiry by noting that two conflicting strands of law required reconciliation. One strand recognized
the need for broad prosecutorial discretion,"' while the other
strand stressed the need to protect defendants' due process rights
from prosecutorial vindictiveness.1 1 4 After reviewing the vindictiveness cases, the Sixth Circuit found that they "pointed the way" to
an objective standard to be used in prosecutorial vindictiveness situations. 15 The standard was whether or not the factual situation
generated a "realistic likelihood of vindictiveness. ' ' 116
According to the Sixth Circuit, if consideration of the prosecutor's conduct and his stake in augmenting the charges reveals a
realistic likelihood of vindictive motivation, a prima facie showing
of vindictiveness violative of due process is established.117 The
burden then shifts to the government to rebut the vindictiveness
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

633 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
Id. at 457.
See supra text accompanying note 94.
Id. at 450.
United States v. Andrews, 612 F.2d 235 (6th Cir. 1979).
See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
633 F.2d at 453.
Id.
Id. at 456.
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presumption through objective information. 18 In Andrews, because the prosecutor obtained the second indictment immediately
after losing the bail appeal, and since he had a stake in keeping the
defendants in jail, a realistic likelihood of vindictive motivation
9
and a prima facie vindictiveness claim were established.
Unlike the Fifth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit rejected the contention that Bordenkircher had effectively overruled the vindictiveness cases or at least controlled the pretrial prosecutor-defendant
relationship."10 The court said that since Bordenkircher allowed
prosecutorial vindictiveness to exist in the plea bargaining context,
an expansive reading of Bordenkircher would be irreconcilable
with the vindictiveness cases, which were "alive and well" outside
of plea bargaining.' 2 ' Therefore, according to the Sixth Circuit,
Bordenkircher had to be read narrowly and had to be confined to
the plea bargaining context in which it arose. 1 2
Analysis
When contrasted with the Bordenkircherstandard employed by
the Fifth Circuit, the Andrews "realistic likelihood" standard provides a greater possibility that a defendant abused by prosecutorial
vindictiveness, at least outside of the plea bargaining situation, will
obtain a remedy." 8 The major failing of the Andrews test, however, is that it clouds the clarity of the vindictiveness cases by creating a standard that rests, in part, upon a consideration of
Bordenkircher. The "realistic likelihood" test was created by
weighing prosecutorial discretion, as advanced by Bordenkircher,
against due process, as promoted by the vindictiveness cases. In
establishing the "realistic" test, the court replaced the "appearance
of vindictiveness" test previously set forth in the vindictiveness
cases."' The Sixth Circuit commented that the "appearance of
118. Id.
119. The court remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the government's evidence. Id. at
457.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. The Sixth Circuit rejected the rule used by the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 453 n.4. In the
Ninth Circuit, a prima facie case for vindictiveness is established once the defendant makes
a showing of a per se "appearance of vindictiveness." The burden then shifts to the prosecution to prove that the increase in the severity of the charges did not result from a vindictive
motivation. See United States v. Burt, 619 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Griffin,
617 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Groves, 571 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1978).
124. See supra note 1.
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vindictiveness" test was "too harsh and operate[d] to unduly limit
prosecutorial discretion."12
Yet the Supreme Court's two major vindictiveness decisions did
not hesitate to limit judicial or prosecutorial discretion outside the
plea bargaining context."" Both decisions advanced prophylactic
rules to limit and protect against abuse, and both employed tests
resting on the appearance of vindictiveness. 3 By changing the appearance of vindictiveness standard in order to accommodate
prosecutorial discretion, the Andrews Court inadvertently and unnecessarily broadened Bordenkircher's influence and application,
instead of limiting Bordenkircher to plea bargaining situations.
The Fourth Circuit and United States v. Goodwin: Rejection of
the Fifth and Sixth Circuit Tests
The Decision
In United States v. Goodwin,M8 the Fourth Circuit explicitly rejected the Fifth and Sixth Circuits' application of Bordenkircher
to instances of vindictiveness arising outside the plea bargaining
situation. In Goodwin, the Fourth Circuit found that the defendant's right to due process had been violated when he was indicted
and tried on a second offense, only after he had exercised his right
to a jury trial on the misdemeanor and petty offense charges originally lodged against him.'" The government argued that
Bordenkircher controlled or that, in any event, the vindictiveness
test used by the Fourth Circuit was faulty and should be replaced
by one modeled after the Fifth or Sixth Circuit tests.'3 0 The court
rejected both arguments.
The court distinguished Bordenkircher by pointing out that the
prosecutor in Bordenkircher had threatened to raise charges during plea bargaining and merely carried out the threat after plea
negotiations had broken down.13' On the other hand, the Goodwin
prosecutor brought new charges without making a clear threat during plea negotiations.'3 2 For the Fourth Circuit, the omission of
125.
126.
(1969).
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

633 F.2d at 457.
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 US. 21 (1974); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711
Id.
637 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 255.
Id. at 254.
Id. at 257.
Id.
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this single fact sufficiently distinguished Bordenkircher from the
case before it.
Once Bordenkircher was distinguished, the court was free to apply a traditionally based vindictiveness test.13 3 That test provides
that once circumstances give rise to a genuine risk of vindictiveness, as evidenced in Goodwin by a second indictment following
the exercise of a procedural right, a per se due process violation is
established which can only be rebutted by a showing that the government could not have brought the increased charges in the first
instance.13 4 Since the government failed to show objective evidence
establishing that the second indictment could not have been filed
with the first,3 ' Goodwin's due process claim withstood the government's challenge.
Analysis
The simplicity with which the Fourth Circuit's test adheres to
and advances vindictiveness law makes it superior to those tests
employed by other circuits. The Fifth and Sixth Circuits, confused
by the Supreme Court's characterization of the Bordenkircher
prosecutor's motivations and actions, fail to apply Bordenkircher
as an exception, and thereby distort vindictiveness case law. The
Fourth
Circuit, however,
succeeds
in
recognizing
the
Bordenkircher exception, while employing a per se standard which
accurately reflects the "appearance of vindictiveness" standard
enunciated by the Supreme Court in its earlier vindictiveness decisions. In keeping with those decisions, the Fourth Circuit's per se
test precludes the possibility, inherent in the methods employed
by the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, that Bordenkircher'splea bargaining exception could erode vindictiveness law by being applied
outside of the plea bargaining context. Further, by placing the burden on the prosecutor to show why increased charges were not filed
initially, the per se test protects defendants by discouraging prosecutors from initially withholding charges to use later in pressuring
defendants to plead guilty.
133. The test was based on the appearance of vindictiveness relied on in Blackledge v.
Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
134. This per se vindictiveness test is also employed by the District of Columbia Circuit.
See United States v. Jamison, 505 F.2d 407 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Velsicol Chem.
Corp., 490 F. Supp. 1255 (D.D.C. 1980). This test differs from the Ninth Circuit test, which
allows the government to rebut the vindictiveness claim with any objective evidence. See
supra note 123.
135. 637 F.2d at 255.
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If the Fourth Circuit continues to constrain Bordenkircher to its
particular facts, however, then like the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, it
will distort one area of case law in order to promote another. Although both the academic criticism levied against Bordenkircher
and the uncertainty with which lower federal courts have applied
the decision suggest the need for a careful approach,
Bordenkircher must be applied in pre-conviction prosecutorial
plea bargaining situations if the dual goals of promoting vindictiveness and plea bargaining case law are to be met. Bordenkircher
must be applied as a necessary but limited exception to the vindictiveness cases, allowing prosecutorial discretion during plea bargaining, while preserving the protections created by the vindictiveness cases.
CONCLUSION

Four years after Bordenkircher v. Hayes, lower federal courts
still struggle to reconcile Bordenkircher with the vindictiveness
cases that preceded it. The problem with this approach, however,
is that Bordenkircher cannot, strictly speaking, be reconciled with
the vindictiveness cases. Whereas the vindictiveness cases dictate
that defendants should be free from fear of retaliatory motivation
on the part of a prosecutor or judge when exercising constitutional
or statutory rights, Bordenkircherholds that the admittedly retaliatory actions of a prosecutor intending to coerce a defendant to
forgo his or her right to trial do not constitute vindictiveness, because such actions take place during plea negotiations. Thus, it
seems that contrary to the Supreme Court's justification of
Bordenkircher,the nature of plea negotiations and the importance
of plea bargaining to the American criminal justice system have
removed prosecutorial discretion during plea bargaining from the
constraints of the vindictiveness cases.
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